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Hone Mandefro
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ABSTRACT
There are contradictory statistics about the number of poor people
and changes in number of poor people in Ethiopia with statistics
ranging from 26 to 86% of the total population in 2013. This
paper analyzed how such contradictory statistics feed into
national politics focusing on who uses which statistics and based
on what justifications of authoritativeness. Drawing from data
collected from print newspapers, blogs, websites, published
articles, party publications, and interviews with four key
informants and combining an actor’s centered discourse analysis
(ACDA) with Van Dick’s (1997) approach of identifying and
analyzing political discourses, the paper deconstructed the
poverty statistics debate in Ethiopia to understand the basic
contestations. Synthesis of the data shows that poverty numbers
are being used as tools for, and manifestations of, ongoing power
struggles in Ethiopia whereby different actors selectively use
poverty statistics that promote their political agenda. While doing
so, the underlying rationale of actors for choosing one statistics
over another was not based on the merit of their preferred set of
statistics over the others but on the suitability of the data for their
political purpose. As such, the government disregards statistics
except its own which portray rapid poverty decline in the country
while opposition groups actively use and promote statistics
coming from international organizations that depict increasing
poverty or a slow rate of reduction of poverty. The paper argues
that the underlying cause of such politicization of numbers is
linked with the developmental statism ideology of the ruling party
in Ethiopia and how it tries to justify its rule in Ethiopia – claiming
that it is reducing poverty and bringing development in Ethiopia
and therefore should be allowed to continue in power. Therefore,
in debating poverty numbers what is being debated is not just
the statistics but the legitimacy of the government, hence politics
by numbers.
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Introduction
There are two sources of legitimacy for any regime: procedural or political and perform-
ance-based legitimacy (World Bank 2011). While the bases of procedural legitimacy have
normative features like democratic procedures, rule of law and constitutionalism,
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performance legitimacy is based on how well the government does in objectives like econ-
omic growth and poverty reduction. In non-democratic regimes, performance in econ-
omic growth and poverty reduction are crucial sources of regime legitimacy. Drawing
from the experience of East Asian countries, Alagappa (1995, p. 293) indicated that ‘in
the absence of an established normative order, the procedural element can’t be the primary
basis on which political authority is claimed’. As the result, other rationales like perform-
ance or normative goals will be more important in the legitimation of governments.
Nevertheless, legitimation based on performance is always dependent on the level of
consensus on the desirability of the goals, and the extent of progress made to the goals.
Due to the global community’s concern as reflected in MDGs and its appealing to large
number of poor people, one of the crucial performance goals in developing countries is
poverty reduction. However, as Fisher (2013) emphasizes, measuring the reduction of pov-
erty is very difficult, and national measurements of poverty are contentious, even in the
best of cases such as China and India. As such poverty knowledge is a manifestation of
‘the influence of institutional arrangements in other ways as well, and in particular the
uneasy, and changing, relations’ among these different actors (O’Connor 2001, p. 10).
In so far as the state’s legitimacy is perceived to be reliant on the extent of poverty
reduction, the measurement and reporting of the progress will be an inherent political pro-
ject. Although there is a considerable discussion of politics of poverty measurement and
poverty knowledge in the western world (Citro and Michael 1995, for the US; Gordon
2000 for Europe), similar analysis of the politics of poverty statistics in connection with
regime legitimacy in developing countries is very rare.
Ethiopia offers an interesting case study to analyze the connection between regime
legitimacy and poverty statistics. First, there is a controversy about poverty prevalence.
According to the government’s statistics, only 26% of the population is living under the
national poverty line. However, statistics from Oxford Poverty and Human Development
Initiative (OPHI) estimate multidimensional poverty as a staggering 87% in 2013. While
estimation discrepancies between national poverty and OPHI poverty are not unique to
Ethiopia and might be caused by a number of measurement procedures, with the estimates
of OPHI three times that of the official statistics, the discrepancy between the two esti-
mates is extreme. Second, with poor democratic credentials, the Ethiopian government
is increasingly relying on justifying its rule on its performance in economic growth and
poverty reduction.
This article examines on what justifications statistical users on poverty prevalence in
Ethiopia select one set of statistics over another alternative statistics. The article also
analyzes the alliances of different actors in the statistical controversy and the link with
the broader legitimacy contestation the regime is facing. Synthesis of the data shows
that poverty numbers are being used as one of the tools in a ongoing power struggle in
Ethiopia whereby statistics that confirm an already predefined political opinion are
used selectively by actors to advance their opinion. As such, poverty statistics are being
used selectively to serve a political objective – politics by numbers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
account of the underlying causes of legitimacy contestations for the ruling regime. The sec-
tion concludes with a discussion of why poverty reduction has become an important pol-
itical objective and hence source of legitimacy for the ruling party. The next section
presents the methodology of the research. The third section presents the alternative
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poverty statistics, the discrepancies, and the manifestations of politicization of the num-
bers. The last part forwards concluding remarks.
The quest for legitimacy and contestations
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democracy Front (EPRDF), the ruling party of
Ethiopia, has its origins in the protracted civil war that began in 1974 and ended in
1991 when ethnic-based liberation fronts defeated the overbrutal military regime. The
EPRDF is a front of four ethno-nationalist parties consisting of the Tigray Liberation
Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo Peoples
Democratic organization (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Move-
ment (SEPOM) through which it is intended to represent the four largest ethnic groups:
Tigre, Amhara, Oromo, and nationalities in the Southern part of the region, respectively.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), led the insurgency war and helped establish
the other three parties at the last stage of the war to form the EPRDF.
With more than 80 ethnic groups, managing diversity has continued to be the main
challenge for the Ethiopian state. Regimes in the past had tried to address ethnic tensions
by fostering one Ethiopianism identity and discouraging ethnic divisions. EPRDF took a
rather radical approach of restructuring the state into nine ethno-linguistic based regional
states, each with their own judicial, executive and legislative power including the right to
self-determination up to secession (Vaughan 2003). However, the prescription of detailed
policies of the ruling party over the regional parties appears to be contradictory to the hall-
mark practice of division of power between the center and states (Fiseha 2006). Besides,
most people ‘claim that the new arrangement in practice institutionalizes a new and
high discriminatory constellation favoring a new EPRDF; primarily Tigrayan elite’
(Vaughan 2003, p. 37). As a result, instead of national unity, the ethnic federalism has
led to increased division by ethnicizing politics, and tensions, controversies and disputes
over border and administrative arrangements (ARPD 2008, p. 2).
The EPRDF follows a unique political ideology called revolutionary democracy that has
its own roots and essence in socialism. However, by the time the EPRDF came to power in
1991, there were global changes that forced EPRDF to consign its socialist rhetoric to fit to
the new global order and ensure that it receives the necessary aid to run the depilated
economy. EPRDF decided to pretend its version of democracy is compatible with liberal
democracy and embarked on a liberal oriented democratization process; civil societies,
opposition parties and private media were established (Clark 2000). The international
community was very hopeful about the democratic process in the country to the extent
that they started to refer to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi as one of the new gen-
eration of African leaders (Clapham 2009). EPRDF won two rounds of national elections
with no major threat from weak and divided opposition forces (Aallen and Tronvoll 2009,
p. 193).
However, the pretense couldn’t sustain the 2005 election when divided political
opposition groups formed two major alliances and managed to win unprecedented
numbers of seats including all the seats in the capital, Addis Ababa. Yet, the final results
from election board declared the EPRDF winner (National Election Board of Ethiopia
2005) and the oppositions claimed election fraud. The post-election crisis that resulted
in killing of 200 people, the arrest of tens of thousands and jailing of opposition party
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leaders and independent journalists ‘revealed that when faced with the real threat of
being ousted from power, the incumbent EPRDF was determined to stay in power by
all means’ (Rakner et al. 2007, p. 19). Since then, the regime has been regularly blamed
for the repression of human rights, the violation of freedom of speech, the prosecution
of journalists and so on (Human Right Watch 2010a, 2010b, 2013, Amnesty Inter-
national 2012). The 2010 national election, in which the EPRDF won all but two
seats, was rated as ‘short of standards of a free and fair election’ (European Union Elec-
tion Observer mission 2010) and ‘re-establishing the one party state’ (Tronvoll 2011).
In the 2015 election, the EPRDF and its ally parties won 100% of the seats in the
national parliament. However, only after months of the 2015 election the regime was
faced with outright protest and resistance from Oromo and Amhara, the two largest
ethnic groups, who are calling for ending marginalization of the two groups from
political power, fairer distribution of power, and economic opportunities. The protests
resulted in the killing of hundreds of protestors and the detention of thousands
(Abbink 2016).
With contested procedural legitimacy, the regime has shifted towards relying increas-
ingly on performance-based legitimacy such as poverty reduction and economic growth.
EPRDF publications discuss the experience of successful developmental states and its the
relevance for the Ethiopian context (EPRDF 2010, 2011). The ruling party explicitly
expresses that to continue in power it has to ensure rapid economic development and
reduce poverty. Therefore, for EPRDF poverty is viewed as an existential threat. With
its history of famine, for many foreigners Ethiopia is still a land of famine and poverty.
The ruling party proclaimed that ‘the main enemy of the county is poverty’ and called
for all effort to be directed against poverty (EPRDF 1995, 2010). In explaining the security
threats, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) urged ‘the danger is that
widening poverty may lead to our collapse’ that ‘the war on poverty [is] most important
and central elements in national security’ (MOFA 2002, p. 18). Aside from the five-year
development plans, there are poverty reduction strategies put in place by the government
specifically aiming at poverty reduction.
Methodology
Understanding the ongoing controversy about the poverty statistics in Ethiopia requires
an eclectic approach to data collection and analysis. Moreover, the methodology used is
informed by unique characteristics of the controversy. First, as would be expected,
many of the debates represented in this paper are happening in major urban areas and
in the media. The usage of the media is intended to make each party’s argument accessible
to the public which both parties of the debate wanted to inform and influence. Conse-
quently, for this paper, I draw heavily on printed, online materials and government and
party publications of both the ruling and opposition parties. Field work was conducted
from 7 June to 3 September 2013 and included the collection of a range of documents,
speeches, online and print materials, and magazine articles written in between 2003
(when the economy, according to the government statistics, started to register double
digit economic growth) and 2013. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) reports of the
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), reports of International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the International Monterey Fund (IMF) and
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World Bank reports were collected. In addition seven interviews with key proponents of
the two sides of the controversy and four interviews with experts at the Central Statistics
Agency were held.
In line with the paper’s proposition of understanding statistical narratives as political
discourses, the analysis used in this paper follows the suggestions of Van Dijk (1997).
Van Dijk identified three elements that have to be analyzed to understand political dis-
courses. These are context, actors and content. Van Dijk defined contexts broadly in
terms of ‘political and communicative events and encounters, with their own settings
(time, place, circumstances), occasions, intentions, functions, goals, and legal or political
implications’ (Van Dijk 1997, p. 14). Context is hard to delimit, however. In this paper, I
analyzed the political economy of poverty reduction in the last decade in Ethiopia with
special emphasis on the way the ruling regime views its relationship with the society. A
particular focus is given to how the regime tries to legitimize itself in the last decade amidst
the contestations it is facing.
The second component of political discourse is actors. Van Dijk, suggested that analyz-
ing who is the actor or participant in debate or controversy is the ‘easiest, and not
altogether misguided’ (Van Dick 1997, p. 12) way to understand political discourses. In
understanding actors, I have analyzed the interactions among them and what historical
or ideological similarities can be identified. Actors are here understood not as holders
of fixed attributes. Indeed, they engage in exchange of discourses, actors interest or self-
awareness may evolve. To put it in other words, ‘ideas “transform” perceptions of interest,
shaping actors’ self-understanding of their own interest’ (Sikkink 1991, p. 243 cited in
Lavers 2013, p. 20). Besides, these ideas and arguments are embodied in historical
socio-political context at national level but also influenced by international practices
and norms. However, it has always been very difficult to empirically capture the influence
of ideas on actors’ interests (Hall 2010). Therefore, rather than taking an ideational
approach, this paper takes an actors-focused approach where the focus is on which
actor is arguing what instead of which idea is influencing which actor. I therefore, first
identify ideas (arguments) and characterize actors’ attributes.
Van Dijk, however, warned that the nature of actors will not automatically make one
controversy a political discourse. He noted that ‘even politicians are not always involved
in political discourse, and the same is obviously true for most other participants, such as
the public or citizens in general, or even members of social movements or action groups’
(Van Dijk 1997, p. 14). Therefore Van Dijk suggests, one has to also analyze the content
of the controversy in the form of practices and activities. To understand the content, I
used argumentation analysis. Argumentation often involves a number of ways of advan-
cing one’s beliefs through strategies such as claiming expert knowledge and playing with
emotions. Departing from a limited analysis of evidence of a research project, to analysis
of broader poverty knowledge, ‘allows an examination of the political and epistemologi-
cal dynamics in the production and use of such knowledge, while still including (but also
reframing) the insights gained into evidence and research’ (Jones et al. 2009, p. 1). I have
analyzed the justifications underpinning claims of authoritative evidence and the
strategies and practices used by each actor to undermine other evidence and enhance
their agency of influencing the debate.
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The contestations on poverty prevalence trend in Ethiopia
Parties of the contestation
Based on the synthesis of the data, two groups are identified; one group believes poverty
has declined, and the other argues poverty has not declined or that it has reduced only
marginally. For the purpose of this article, I have dubbed these two groups as poverty
reduction believers and poverty reduction doubters. Each group consisting of diverse groups
of individuals including scholars, politicians and journalists.
Members of the poverty reduction believers group argue that poverty has rapidly
declined in Ethiopia in the last decade. They also believe that the economic growth in
Ethiopia in the last decade has contributed a lot to poverty reduction. This group consists
of the ruling party, the state owned Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, Addis Zemen
and Ethiopian Herald, the Central Statistics Agency (CSA, hereafter) and other govern-
ment institutions that are legally expected to use the poverty data from CSA. Some
media not owned by the state such as Walata Information Center and Ethiopian News
Agency and foreign-based online news outlets including Aiga forum and Tigrai online
fall to this group.
On the other hand, the poverty reduction doubters reject the government’s statistics
and believe poverty has not declined. They argue that not only are the government’s
economic growth statistics overestimated but also that even by the government’s
growth statistics, the growth is not pro-poor and cannot result in such rapid poverty
decline as claimed by the poverty reduction believers. The group consists of a coalition
of political parties such as Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) and Blue Party,
media and scholars. Other opposition groups have argued for this position for private
newspapers, but it is difficult to be sure whether their position is official or just expres-
sing their stands. The Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and the Zehabesha News-
paper are among foreign-based media outlets and many of the print newspapers in
Ethiopia including Addis Neger (until 2010), Feteh (now defunct), and Addis Guday
are also in this group.
Arguments and evidence of poverty reduction believers
Findings of National Poverty Surveys: National poverty surveys are the main evidence
cited by this group. Four national Household Consumption and Expenditure surveys
(HCES) were conducted by the CSA since 1996 while the latest and fifth-round HCES
is being conducted in 2016. As Table 1 shows, according to the results from these surveys
poverty head count has declined by 34.9% between 1995 and 2011. In a budget speech, the
Minister of Finance and Economy Development (MOFED) reported that in 2012/13 the
poverty head count has further declined to 27.6%1 (Ahmed 2013). Poverty is more preva-
lent and severe in rural areas than urban areas with figures from the latest survey of 2010/
11 showing 30.45% head count poverty in rural areas compared to 25.7% in urban areas.
Nevertheless, the overall reduction in poverty is substantial. The government and its allies
present this poverty reduction as very high level of achievement to be a celebrated story,
and the statistics are inevitably quoted in many political speeches, and government reports
(See MOFED 2012, 2013, Ahmed 2013).
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Pro-poor economic growth
According to the government statistics presented in Table 2, Ethiopia has experienced fast
economic growth especially for the last decade. The poverty reduction believers draw on
these statistics to argue that the economic growth has contributed to reduction in poverty
in Ethiopia.
The poverty reduction believers argue that economic growth was not only rapid but also
is a pro-poor economic growth that has resulted in millions moving out of poverty. This
can be seen from the quote below in an article featured on a government website:
This economic growth brought positive trends in reducing poverty, in both urban and rural
areas, reducing the number of Ethiopians living under extreme poverty by 9 percent within
five years. Overall it also made considerable progress in most of the human development
indicators. (Yifter 2013)1
They also argue that pro-poor programs are the reason for rapid poverty decline:
Such achievement in the reduction of poverty can be attributed to the wide-ranging and
multi-faceted pro-poor programs that have been implemented in rural and urban areas
such as intensification of agriculture, infrastructural development, food security programs,
the pro-poor urban development activities (such as development of micro and small scale
enterprise development and use of cobblestone in urban road construction, housing con-
struction. (MOFED 2012, p. 13, emphasis mine)
Poverty reduction believers are convinced that economic growth has contributed to
poverty reduction in the country either by providing ﬁnance for pro-poor programs
or through a growth pattern that disproportionally beneﬁt the poor (i.e. pro-poor
growth).
Table 1. Poverty prevalence trends in Ethiopia.
Poverty Trends
Reporting Level Indicator 1995/6 1999/00 2004/5 2010/11 Change (from 1996 to 2011 in %)
National Head Count index 0.455 0.442 0.387 0.296 34.9
Poverty gap index 0.129 0.119 0.083 0.078 39.5
Poverty severity Index 0.051 0.045 0.027 0.031 39.2
Rural Head Count index 0.475 0.454 0.393 0.304 36
Poverty gap index 0.134 0.122 0.085 0.080 40.3
Poverty severity Index 0.053 0.046 0.027 0.032 39.6
Urban Head Count index 0.332 0.369 0.351 0.257 22.5
Poverty gap index 0.099 0.101 0.077 0.069 30.3
Poverty severity Index 0.041 0.039 0.026 0.027 34.1
Source: MOFED 2012, p. 9.
Table 2. GDP growth (constant price) of Ethiopia.
Year GDP growth rate (Gov’t report)
2003/4 13.6
2004/5 11.8
2005/6 10.8
2006/7 8.5
2007/8 10.8
2008/9 8.8
2009/10 12.6
2010/11 11.3
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia (October 2013).
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International organizations’ endorsement
The poverty reduction believers argue that not only the statistics produced by the govern-
ment are convincing but also they have been endorsed by interstate organizations such as
the World Bank and IMF. The World Bank development indicators database doesn’t pro-
vide detailed estimations of poverty in Ethiopia except an estimation of the proportion of
people living below 1.25 USD per day at 38.7% in 2011. However, Guang Zhe Chen, the
then World Bank Country Director for Ethiopia, praised the government saying that ‘two
and a half million people in Ethiopia have been lifted out of poverty’ and its target to
reduce poverty to 22.2% in 2015 is attainable.2 Agreeing with the government’s claim
that there is a ‘dramatic decline in the incidence of poverty over the last decade’, the
IMF praised Ethiopia, for being ‘successful in translating economic growth into higher liv-
ing standards for its citizens’ in a pace that has outperformed many Sub-Saharan African
countries (IMF 2013, p. 4). Poverty reduction believers use such endorsements of govern-
ment poverty statistics by IMF andWorld Bank as a way of dismissing questions about the
statistics.
Arguments and evidence of poverty reduction doubters
This group presents arguments-cum-evidence to justify their position that poverty
reduction has not happened at all or has happened only very marginally. The first and
the main statistics they present are the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) poverty
estimate for Ethiopia. Second, methodological gaps in the official poverty surveys and
lack of independence and weak capability of statistical system make the poverty reduction
and economic growth estimates of the government unreliable and invalid. Each of these
are discussed below.
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
It is a global estimate of multidimensional poverty by the Oxford Poverty and Human
Development Initiative (OPHI). MPI measures aspects of deprivation people experience
at the same time using three dimensions and ten indicators: two for heath (nutrition
and child mortality), two for education (years of schooling and child attendance to
school), and six for living standards (access to electricity, safe drinking water, quality of
house, cooking fuel type, sanitation, and asset ownership). The data for these indicators
come from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of each country.
According to MPI methodology a person will be considered poor if he/she is deprived of
one of the three or more of these ten indicators. MPI calculates national poverty values for
each country by multiplying headcount ratio of poor (the number of poor people out of the
total population) and intensity of poverty, measured by the proportion of indicators in
which the poor are deprived simultaneously (for a detailed discussion of the methodology
of MPI, see Alkire and Foster 2011). MPI estimates are produced for more than 100
countries, Ethiopia included, that are updated when countries publish new rounds of DHSs.
Ethiopia’s MPI was calculated from DHSs conducted in 2000, 2005 and 2010. As
Table 3 shows, the MPI estimates the poverty prevalence rate in Ethiopia at 90% in
2005 and 87.3% in 2010. There is a high difference between the national consumption
based poverty measure (HICEs) and the MPI head count. The MPI estimate of percentage
of poor people is more than double that of the HICEs in all three points of estimate 2000,
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2005, and 2010. With such high MPI estimates the report has consistently ranked Ethiopia
as the second poorest country after only Niger since 2007.
Poverty reduction doubters tend to depict the MPI as a better poverty measurement
than the consumption and income based poverty measures used by the official survey
in Ethiopia. Tesfaye (2010b) argues the ‘$1.25 per day thresholds have been highly criti-
cized for focusing solely on income. Economists have argued that family income cannot
be the only determinant, whether that particular family is extremely poor or not’ (paragraph
5). In comparison, the MPI ‘shows the nature of poverty better than income alone. Know-
ing not just who is poor but how they are poor is essential for effective human develop-
ment programs and policies’ (The African Economist 2013). As the result, the release of
MPI for Ethiopia is presented as a tool which exposes a new truth about poverty preva-
lence in Ethiopia:
Until last week, 39 percent of [the] people were classified as living in extreme poverty. That is
the old story. A ‘new’ day has arrived to polish the old threshold; at least theoretically… The
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which measures multidimensional aspects of pov-
erty, shows that 90 percent of the Ethiopian people are today living in extreme poverty…
According to the study, Ethiopia has the lowest performance indices in all three aspects
and said to be the poorest of the poor [countries]… the MPI value of Ethiopia is 0.58.
This value is even greater than that of neighboring countries such as Somalia. (Tesfaye
2010a, emphasis mine)
Tesfaye also stresses how Ethiopia’s MPI was very bad, with the phrase ‘even greater than’
Somalia which hadn’t had a central government for more than 20 years by then. In an
apparent connection of the 19 years EPRDF stayed in power with the high prevalence
of poverty in Ethiopia, Tesfaye’s article is entitled ‘Multidimensional Poverty: A Fruit of
19 Years’.
Methodological gaps of the official poverty surveys
Poverty reduction doubters argue that the four rounds of national surveys have a num-
ber of methodological gaps that would affect the validity and reliability of the estimates,
and presented five main criticisms. The first gap in the official poverty surveys is the
exclusion of some areas from the surveys. The second national poverty survey of 2002
excluded Somali region while the 2005 and 2010/11 survey excluded all areas of Gam-
bella region and nine zones in Afar and Somali region inhabited by non-sedentary popu-
lations (See MOFED 2012, 2013). For instance, Devereux and Sharp argue ‘the original
sampling frame [for the 1999/2000 HICES] was too small and unrepresentative to pro-
vide a basis for extrapolating national poverty levels or trends’ (Devereux and Sharp
2003, p. 1).
Table 3. Trends of multidimensional poverty in Ethiopia.
Year
MPI indicators Comparison with national poverty head count
MPI
score
% of poor
people
Avergae intensity across
the poor
% Difference (MPI- national
estimate)
Ratio d/nice (MPI:
national)
2000 0.678 93.6 72.4% 49.4 2.1
2005 0.582 90.0 64.7% 51.3 2.3
2010 0.564 87.3 64.6 57.7 2.9
Soure: Compiled form Oxford Poverty and Human Developemnt Initiative (OPHI) various years.
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The poverty line is the most important and ‘also the most controversial element of any
poverty research’ (Szulc 2006, p. 426). Therefore, the assessment of the trends of poverty in
the country is highly dependent on the accuracy and appropriateness of the poverty line.
In line with this, the second criticism of poverty reduction doubters is that the poverty line
in Ethiopia which is set at 1075 birr (0.60 USD per day in 1996) in the first round, and was
used for subsequent surveys indexed for Consumption Price Index (CPI), is very low. Pov-
erty reduction doubters cite qualitative studies and local level quantitative studies which
indicate that people can’t buy any kind of food with this amount in any urban center in
Ethiopia (Abroad 2011). These they argue that with such low poverty line, ‘[i]t is possible
for people to cross the poverty threshold without a qualitative difference in their standard
of living’ (Bigsten and Shemeles 2011, p. 835).
The third criticism is the use of only one national poverty line. This group argues the
cost of living in regions differs so greatly that using the national CPI to measure poverty is
misleading. For instance, Gebremedhin and Whelan examined price and living cost in
Ethiopian major cities and found out that cost of living and price vary enormously.
They concluded that ‘the use of a country level CPI, which does not account for spatial
cost of living differences, gives incorrect poverty estimates’ (Gebremedhin and Whelan
2005, p. 11).
The fourth criticism is that the indicators used for monitoring poverty may not be the
appropriate ones because they are inconsistent with qualitative studies of poverty. To sup-
port this claim, this group cites qualitative poverty studies that were depicting an increas-
ing poverty contrary to quantitative consumption based measures which indicated a
decline in poverty prevalence. For instance, Rahmato and Kidanu’s Ethiopia’s country
study for the World Bank Voices of the Poor report emphasized that in the 1990s ‘(i) a
lot of households have moved from the middle to the lowest category and (ii) a new cat-
egory of the weak and disabled has been added [to the poor category]’ (Rahamato and
Kindu 1999, p. 103). Another study of subjective poverty among urban five major cities
of Ethiopia concluded that ‘the share of households that perceive themselves as poor
has barely changed at all between 1994 and 2009’ (Alem et al. 2012, p. 2).
‘The statistics is in mess’: questioning the institutional capacity of poverty
monitoring
Poverty reduction doubters argue that the statistical system in Ethiopia lacks capacity to
administer accurate and reliable national surveys. Gebremariam argues:
The Central Statistics Agency (CSA) and the National Accounts Department of the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development are the two institutions in Ethiopia that are respon-
sible for keeping track of the statistical data and providing analysis on economic perform-
ance. But neither organization has the institutional capability to collect reliable and
accurate economic data, let alone assemble complete and comprehensive data sets which
could serve as empirical bases for economic prognostications. This fact was emphatically sta-
ted on March 24, 2010 in the official statement of Paul Mathieu, the IMF team leader who,
after conducting an evaluation of the current half fiscal year economic performance of Ethio-
pia, said: ‘Statistics collection of the country requires transformations, and we advised the
government to do that.’ (Gebremariam 2012)
By quoting the IMF team Leader, Gebremariam tries to show that not only the problem of
statistical incapacity is indisputable but it has been also recognized by others who
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 395
suggested the government to do something. This group draws on IMF to justify its pos-
ition that the statistical system is incapable. However, IMF’s report on the Observance
of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) is not available for Ethiopia. According to World
Bank statistical capacity assessment, however, Ethiopia ranks as one of the countries
with better statistical capacity ranking with scores higher in each year than the African
average (Jervan 2013).
For this group, as the result of this institutional weakness, the statistical system in
Ethiopia is in mess at the moment. In a piece titled ‘In today’s Ethiopia, numbers have
lost, their Meaning’ Chait (2010) wrote:
Given the flagrant tampering with almost all national data, in today’s Ethiopia numbers have
no meaning. In politics or economics!…A post-Meles government should hope that the first
help it gets is from statisticians without borders to clean the statistical mess we are in. (Chait
2010)
Chat emphasizes that the problem is deep rooted using terms like ‘mess’, and ‘numbers
lost meaning’. Besides, Chat’s phrase of ‘a post-Meles government’ is interesting because
it signals two tendencies of this group. First, it shows the group’s belief that responsibility
for the statistic mess is Meles’ or his government’s (instead of lack of trained human
capacity or the large and diverse geography and population of the country that can
make statistical system very difﬁcult, for instance). Second, the phrase post-Meles govern-
ment points out to this group’s belief that solving the ‘mess’ requires deposing Meles and
his government from power. As such, what should come ﬁrst is not cleaning the ‘statistical
mess’, but toppling the government. Then only ‘the statistical without borders’ can clean
the mess.
‘Torture the data until it confess’: questioning objectivity
Poverty reduction doubters also argue that the statistical system lacks autonomy from the
ruling party and as a result the ruling party is using the statistical institutions to fabricate
statistics. This can be clearly seen in the quote below form Fenote Nesanet, the opposition
UDJ party newspaper:
It has always never been clear why the economic performance reports are expected to be
approved by the council of ministers. Like other countries, institutions that monitor unem-
ployment, job creation, and economic growth/de-growth etcetera should be autonomous. If
we have to believe statistical reports, government should refrain from interfering in works of
institutions that produce such reports and should ensure the autonomy of these institutions
both in law and practice. However, what is being done now is very clear – torture the data
until it confesses. (Fenote Nesant 2012, p. 4)
Furthermore, the fabrication of data is the manifestations of authoritarian nature of the
regime. ‘Cooking data is the character of many autocratic regimes. They deny autonomy
for institutions that collect and gather data’ (Fenote Nesant 2012, p. 2). Thus, for poverty
reduction doubters, the ruling party is playing statistical game in which ‘the bottom line on
the regime’s statistical claim’ is that the ﬁgures are cooked up in the Central Statistics
Ofﬁce (Gebremariam 2010).
The poverty reduction doubter group also claim that the government has blocked inde-
pendent researchers from conducting independent poverty surveys. This is presented as
indication that the data was ‘cooked up’. For instance, an Ethiopian origin American
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Economics professor explained to a pro-opposition TV, ESAT that his research team was
expelled from the country within 48 hours from the moment the government knew they
were doing poverty assessments (Getachew Begashaw InterviewWith ESAT 2012, minutes
18:00–25:00).
The economic growth rate is overestimated
The poverty reduction doubters group believes that the economic growth estimates are
also overestimated. The IMF has been estimating economic growth as less than the gov-
ernment has for a few years. IMF 2010/11 country economy report stated that ‘strong
growth has continued in 2010/11 that the [IMF] estimates at 7.5 percent (compared to
an official estimate of 11.4 percent).’ A similar discrepancy is reported for the Economic
Update of 2012 (see IMF 2012, p. 1).
This group also criticizes the IMF for not doing detailed analysis beyond stating discre-
pancies between estimates:
In its official reports, the IMF simply accepts and incorporates at face value the data for GDP
growth given to it by the Central Statistics Office (with its own staff estimates) and incorpor-
ates those figures… slavishly (with a wink, nod and a smile) parrots back to the world the
same figures with some of its own ‘staff estimates and projections’ …without so much as
qualifying it for completeness, accuracy or reliability’ of the data that comes from a system
that IMF said ‘needs massive transformation’ (Gebremariam 2010).
For other members of this group, ‘IMF and UN have no choice but to just use the exag-
gerated data provided to them [by the Government]’ (Begashaw Interview with ESAT part
2 November 28 2012) and thus, the continuing usage of ofﬁcial statistics is not because the
statistics is authentic but because IMF and the World Bank are bound to use government
ofﬁcial statistics.
Politics by numbers: manifestations, structures and agency
Controversies can happen for a range of reasons. So what are the manifestations of the
political nature of the debate? To answer this question we will analyze the actors in
each group and their relationship with the regime, the content of the debate, as well as
the strategies of each party to enhance their capacity of maintaining the hegemony of
their representation of poverty trends in Ethiopia.
Actors alliance
The first and perhaps defining manifestation of the political nature of the poverty debate is
the coalition of members in each group. In explaining the nature of a political discourse,
Van Dijk wrote that ‘the easiest, and not altogether misguided, answer is that political dis-
course is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians’ (Van Dijk 1997, p. 12). Indeed,
looking into the arrangement of forces debating the poverty numbers, it clearly emerges
that the members of each party are the same actors we found in many other political
issues. Essentially, those who believe that poverty has reduced include the ruling party
and its government apparatus including state media. Other private owned news outlets
as Aiga Frum are known to be supporters of the party. A clear indication is that in its
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website, the ruling party mentions the website of those media outlets while any of the pov-
erty reduction doubters’ media outlets are not presented.
Similarly, the arguments of the poverty reduction doubters group are presented either
in opposition parties’ newspapers, such as Fenote Nesanet, or the private presses that are
very critical of the government. One of such private presses that has strongly promoted the
MPI index was the Amharic weekly Addis Neger where Tesfyae was the Economy colum-
nist. The paper had managed to draw the highest readership in the history of Ethiopia’s
private press until it ceased publication in 2009 and its staff went into exile allegedly
receiving imminent threat of prosecution by the government (Berhane 2010). Articles
in Aiga forum, a pro-ruling-party website, denounced Addis Neger editors when they
went exile, labeling their move as ‘self-exile’ motivated by other interests than fear of
imminent prosecution. Besides, although the government denies it was preparing to jail
them, later it charged the two editors of the online section of the paper they created
after exile, for ‘abetting, aiding, and supporting a terrorist group’ through their website
and sentenced each to eight years’ prison in their absence (Oromedia 2012). In addition
to these media outlets, scholars who are critical of the government like Gebremariam
(2010, 2012), are also among the poverty reduction doubters. The state-owned daily
newspaper, Addis Zemen, had wrote a couple of times blaming the media outlets airing
poverty reduction doubters analysis such as Addis Neger, and Individuals such as
Gebremariam accusing partial presentation. Such hostilities between the two groups
suggest that these two coalitions didn’t emerge out of the poverty trend debate but instead
are pre-existing groups with political rivalry.
Content of the debate
Although the identity of the actors in debate and their organization is important in
understanding a controversy, merely the identity of the participants can’t make the
debate spontaneously political. Van Dijk notes ‘even politicians are not always
involved in political discourse, and the same is obviously true for most other partici-
pants’ (1997, p. 14). Thus, the nature of political debate also depends on the content of
the debate.
As the quotes above show, the content of the debate focuses on how much the govern-
ment is successful in reducing poverty. The source of controversy in poverty knowledge
can be either different ontological views of what poverty is or epistemological differences
about who is the legitimate knower about poverty (Kura and Sulaiman 2012). However,
the central debate of the prevalence of poverty in Ethiopia at the moment seems mainly
on the ‘correct’ number of poor people and to a lesser extent on the method that has to
be used to measure poverty. Understandably, such selection of emphasis on numbers is
because ‘numbers provide a unique means with which to simplify and communicate com-
plex social phenomena’ such as poverty (Clegg 2010, p. 474). Through numbers, each
party tries to make its story accessible to the ordinary public who lacks both the time
and expertise to understand the complex process involved in knowing the trends of pov-
erty in the country.
Another and perhaps the clearest indications of the political driven nature of the debate
is the way each party relates the poverty prevalence in the country to the developmental
state ideology of the ruling party. The poverty reduction believers argue the developmental
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statism was the reason for poverty reduction. In a piece that advances the poverty
reduction believers’ argument, Yifter argues:
[Meles Zenawi’s] vision allowed Ethiopia to establish a strong developmental state, a success
story for other African countries to emulate. It was designed to lift the country out of poverty
[by] reducing the number of Ethiopians living under extreme poverty. (Yifter 2013)
Another quote from the poverty reduction believers group also attributes the reduction in
poverty to the developmental sate:
The country’s image abroad is changing for the better. One can confidently say that, although
a lot more remains to be done, the age-old backwardness, poverty and famine that the
country was suffering from are now history. This, no doubt, is the result of the relevance
and correctness of the policies of the Ethiopian government led by EPRDF. (Gebresellasie
2012)
However, the same developmental state ideology is by the poverty reduction doubters for
its being the underlying cause for fabrications of numbers.
[… ] not achieving the targets stated in the growth and transformation plan (for example,
economic growth plan, poverty reduction plan etcetera) means, shaking the developmental
state propaganda that EPRDF is standing on. Therefore proclaiming the reduction of poverty
and continuity of economic growth (whether it is true or false) has become a matter of exist-
ence for EPRDF. (Fenote Nesanet 2012, p. 12)
Structures and strategies to heighten agency
What is constraining each party’s attempt to ensure hegemony of their representation is
the focus of this section. According to Leipold and Winkel (2013, p. 8) discourse is
both representation (of societal structures) and interaction (of actors) – the former referring
to the representation of meaning structures of social practice in (written and spoken) text, the
latter referring to the processes and conditions of inter-subjective communication which cre-
ate these textual representations.
In this continuous and reactive communication, structural factors play an important role
in constraining and enhancing the relative position of actors in dominating the discourse.
A set of enhancing and constraining factors are discussed for each party below.
For the poverty reduction believers group, led by the government, the first and main
enhancing factors is legalrational power of the government as a representative of the
state. Despite the contestations of its legitimacy, and as long as the ruling party is in
power, the ruling party commends a legal-rational power. This involves the authority to
collect information on the economy of the nation, to provide data for inter-state organiz-
ations such as the IMF, World Bank and United Nations.
Although IMF and the World Bank are skeptical of the government statistics, as inter-
state organizations they are legally and politically bound to use government statistics in
combination with their own estimates and projects which makes them to be part of the
legitimatizing forces of the discourse of the ruling government. Usually, the IMF and
World Bank are accused of constraining poverty reduction in developing countries due
to their neo-liberal policies. The governments of Ethiopia, as like many other developing
countries, is portrayed as entangled between responding to citizens’ demand of resistance
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of these financial institutions and the need to receive the finance that would flow from
these organizations. In the case of statistics on poverty reduction, however, IMF and
World Bank are part of the legitimizing hegemony for the government by promoting
its poverty reduction discourses thorough legitimatizing government’s statistics, and quot-
ing them in their reports, there by contributing to the governments hegemony of the dis-
course on poverty statistics in the country. Thus, the inter-state formation of IMF and
World Bank, by demanding them to use government’s statistics, contributes to silence
of voices of actors in difficult relationship with a state. On the other hand, the existence
of institutions that are not bound to use government data free from nation states such
as OPHI, enhances the agency of the opposition in its attempt to contest the discourse,
suggesting how such international initiatives can be used effectively to engage in a state’s
internal politics.
Poverty reduction believers and the ruling party in particular draw on other strategies
to ensure the hegemony of their discourse. One of the strategies is limiting production of
alternative knowledge on poverty, by using its database. The full datasets of HICE and
WMS, on which the government’s poverty reduction reports are based, are not available
for public use. Individual researchers can receive micro data per region or a selected
number of indicators. However, the full dataset is not available for public use or individual
researchers. CSA doesn’t allow access to the full data set for researchers ‘so that they
will not come up with their own reports on national poverty’ (CSA Staff C Interview,
21 August 2013). Besides, the micro datases available on the World Bank database
also have a disclaimer that ‘household expenditure dataset can’t be used to calculate pov-
erty’. As a result, there is no alternative to the government’s report based on the full
dataset.
This limited access to the dataset is both enhancing and constraining for the poverty
reduction doubters group’s agency. Although they accuse the government of data manipu-
lation, they can’t back up this claim with alternative reports based on the same dataset.
However, the continued restriction of access to the dataset can be considered as advan-
tageous for this group because it enables the group to sustain its accusations of data
manipulation.
The second strategy of the poverty reduction believers group is to silence alternative
knowledge based on other datasets. As we have already seen the main poverty estimate
the poverty reduction doubters’ group draw on is the MPI index. For instance, despite
both local and intentional media coverage of the Ethiopia’s poverty statistics in OPHI
for years, the government didn’t react to the MPI reports presumably because it believed
that publicizing the OPHI reports would be detrimental to the government’s narrative of
rapid decline of poverty.
However, scholars within the poverty reduction believers group tried to undermine the
credibility of the OHPI report. For instance Adugna (2010, p. 2) argues ‘the OPHI report
gives the wrong impression’ for three reasons. His first criticism is that the MPI report of
2010 used the 2004 data and hence doesn’t reflect the situation in 2010 because ‘many
changes have been observed in the country since 2004/05’ (Adugna 2010, p. 8). However,
this is unfair criticism as MPI estimates by OPHI clearly indicated that the estimate is for
2005. Adugna then turned in to the weight of indictors in MPI and comments ‘like other
people I believe that it is not fair to give equal weight for child mortality and nutrition level
in the same family’ (Adugna 2010, p. 8). Lastly, he criticizes the inclusion of only 10
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indicators in the MPI arguing that ‘at least when we compare it with the MDGs, it is less by
thirty eight indicators’ (Adugna 2010, p. 9).
One of the factors for the success of actors in dominating a discourse is their
knowledge on the subject matter (Leipold and Winkel 2013). As the result, despite his
intention to undermine the MPI, Adunga missed some other fundamental criticisms
of the MPI discussed in the literature. First, the cut-off point for poverty status in
MPI (set at one-third of the ten indicators) is not only a normative judgment that
one can contest, but also ‘does not resolve the more fundamental issue of how the
dimensions and cut-offs should be chosen’ in measuring poverty (Fischer 2013,
p. 12). To what extent the cut-off point or the composition of the indictors in the Ethio-
pian context is realistic can be contested. Second, the composite index of MPI, which
puts Ethiopia the poorest in the world next to Niger (which the poverty reduction doubt-
ers group highly emphasizes), was criticized on two grounds. First, since the basic
rational of the multidimensional poverty is to show poverty in different dimensions,
‘It is not the aggregate index that we need for this purpose [of knowing the trend in
all of the three dimensions of MPI) but its component’ (Ravallion 2011, p. 7–8). Further-
more, ‘the complexity of the exercise [involved in calculating the composite MPI score]
renders the resulting index even more opaque and less intuitive than money-metric
measures’ (Fischer 2013, p. 12). The implication of missing these weaknesses of the
MPI in the debate means that the poverty reduction doubters’ narrative of MPI as
a superior measure of poverty to the government’s consumption based report was rela-
tively unchallenged.
Another strategy used by both groups to enhance the hegemony of their representation
of the poverty trend in Ethiopia is building discourse collation with the media. The ruling
party controls the state-owned media and propagates its own discourse with no space for
the other party’s view. Previous research has showed that the state media in Ethiopia lacks
autonomy to reflect views that may undermine the regimes credibility (Skjerdal 2012).
The poverty reduction doubters created a coalition with most of the private media try to
counter the government’s rapid poverty discourse by creating storyline that shows how life
has worsened in the last decade by interviewing ordinary people sometimes with their des-
perate picture (and interviewing experts on the subject, usually economics professors: see
Tesfaye 2010b for instance). According to this group, the independence of the media and
the ‘objective view’ of the experts are supposedly the reason for people to believe the pos-
ition that poverty has not declined or has declined marginally. However, the government
accuses the print media of being a propaganda machine for the opposition. This tense
relationship with local private media, especially print newspapers and magazines, many
believe is the reason behind the closure of 70 newspapers and magazines in the last
20 years and the jailing of many journalists (VOA 2013).
Conclusions and implications
Two discourses of poverty prevalence trends in Ethiopia are competing at the moment.
One discourse argues poverty has declined rapidly in the last two decades. The other dis-
course depicts that poverty hasn’t declined and has remained widespread. This study
examined these discourses in detail to understand who the main actors/participants of
the debate are and what evidence they use to support their positions. To understand
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these discourses, the research analyzed main documents representing each discourse and
primary data from interviews.
The study found that the two discourses on poverty prevalence in Ethiopia draw on
contradicting statistics. The rapid poverty decline discourse draws on the government’s
statistics that shows headcount poverty dropped from 44.5% in 1996 to 29.6% in 2010.
This group also argues that the economy has been growing fast and has contributed to
poverty reduction. Moreover, it argues that doubts about poverty decline are unsubstan-
tiated as poverty reduction has been attested by international organizations. On the other
hand, those who doubt poverty decline draw on the multidimensional poverty estimates of
OPHI that estimates poverty at 87.3% in 2010, a marginal decline from 93% in 2000 and
90% in 2005. They argue that the MPI score is a better indicator of the measure of poverty
than the consumption-based measures. Furthermore, drawing on the discrepancy between
IMF’s growth of Ethiopian economy with the government (which is higher than IMF’s),
the poverty reduction doubters (1) argue that the economic growth is not as fast as the gov-
ernment claims, (2) blames the statistical system of the country as weak, and (3) accuse the
government of fabricating and manipulating data.
The synthesized data shows that poverty numbers are being used as tools for, and mani-
festation of, ongoing power struggles in Ethiopia whereby different actors are using selec-
tively poverty statistics that promote their political agenda. While doing so, the underlying
rationale of actors for choosing one set of statistics over another was not based on the
merit of their preferred statistics over the others but on the suitability of the data for
their own purposes. Thus, the government disregards statistics except its own, while oppo-
sition groups actively use and promote statistics coming from international organizations
that depict increasing poverty/slow rates in the reduction of poverty. The paper argued
that the underlying cause of such politicization of numbers is linked with the developmen-
tal statism ideology of the ruling party in Ethiopia and how it tries to justify its rule in
Ethiopia – claiming that it is reducing poverty and bringing development to Ethiopia
and therefore should be allowed to continue in power. This study showed that in contexts
where a regime’s legitimacy is contested and is perceived to be successful in poverty
reduction, measuring progress towards poverty becomes highly politicized. As a result,
poverty knowledge becomes deeply contested among actors with different interests. In
arguing so, the paper also demonstrates how statistics as well as their production and
usage are contextually and socially constructed and influenced.
Notes
1. Although I used many texts not paged and presented as html online, for clarity and space, I
haven’t included paragraph numbers when I cite directly.
2. Cited in http://www.meleszenawi.com/world-bank-group-2-5-million-ethiopians-lifted-out-
of-poverty-over-the-past-5-years-as-a-result-of-strong-economic-growth-video/
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